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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARCH DAM CONSTRUCTORS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
9384 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
PURPOSE FOR A REPLY BRIEF 
Respondent's brief presented a legal argument unantici-
pated by Petitioner in that it asserted that the general public 
may use a road as a matter of right against persons not claiming 
any ownership interest in the land traversed by the road, 
though the public has no right against the owner of the land, 
and thus satisfy the definition of highway as contained in 
Section 41-1-1 (bb), Utah Code Annotated ( 195 3), making 
vehicles using such road subject to license and registration fees. 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is in response to that argument that this reply brief addresses 
itself. 
ARGUMENT: PUBLIC USE OF A HIGHWAY nASA 
MATTER OF RIGHT" MEANS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
AGAINST ONE HAVING AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST 
IN THE LAND TRAVERSED BY THE HIGHWAY. 
Respondent Tax Commission has admitted that the general 
public does not use the access road as a matter of right against 
the United States, who is the sole owner of the land traversed 
by the access road, but argues that the general public has some 
type of nright" against petitioner Arch Dam Constructors 
which is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 41-1-1 
(bb), Utah Code Annotated ( 195 3). This position is made 
clear on page 5 of respondent's brief, where it is argued that: 
nAppellant's recitation of statutes relative to the 
acquisition of property rights or rights of use as against 
the federal government is of no concern in this case. 
It is true that the access road was not officially dedicated 
to public use or abandoned to public use, but the 
federal government itself has given the public a legally 
enforceable claim against appellant by the terms of 
Paragraph 48 of the contract between the Arch Dam 
Constructors and the United States of America." (Em-
phasis added) . 
The clear statutory requirement of a public use as a matter 
of right is satisfied, according to respondent, if there is anyone 
who cannot enjoin the public from using the access road. It is 
immaterial, says respondent, whether the public has any right 
against the owner of the land. Therefore, unless respondent 
can sustain this argument, its entire case fails, for there is no 
other claim of right in the public. 
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No authority has been found anywhere which even inti-
mates that a highway can be established by securing a ((right" 
against someone who is not an owner of the land. Indeed, on 
the contrary, all of the authorities are uniformly in accord in 
declaring that a public right to use a highway is an interest in 
the land which cannot be obstructed by the owner of the 
servient estate. The following citations illustrate the concept 
of a right in the public, and exhaustive citations to case authority 
appear in the treatises cited to support the excerpts hereinafter 
set forth: 
((A highway is regarded as an easement and is re-
garded as an easement of perpetual character, and 
therefore a freehold estate, or incorporeal hereditament. 
It is an interest in land." 39 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Highways, Section 1, pages 910-11 (emphasis added). 
(( ... the rights and title of an abutting owner who 
owns the fee to the land over which a highway runs 
are subject and subordinate to the easement and servi-
tude in favor of the public." 25 Am. fur., Highways, 
Section 136 (emphasis added). 
C(The presumption is that the adjoining proprietors 
on each side of a road own to its center. As such owners, 
they have the exclusive right to the soil, subject only, 
in general, to the easement or the right of passage in 
the public and the incidental right of properly fitting 
the way of use." Elliott, Roads and Streets, Vol. 2, Sec-
tion 876, p. 1141 (emphasis added). 
CtSubject only to the public easement, the proprietor 
has all the usual rights and remedies of the owner of 
a freehold." Elliott, Roads and Street, Vol. 2, Section 
876.1, p. 1142 (emphasis added). 
Accord: Elliott, Roads and Streets, Vol. 1, Sections 483-84. 
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It is clear that the public never obtains any right to use a 
highway unless and until there has been a Hdedication" to a 
public use. A dedication is not necessarily a formal thing, for 
the word is broad enough to include anything which gives 
to the public a right of use: 
"Dedication is the setting apart of land for the public 
use. It is essential to every valid dedication that it should 
conclude the owner, and that, as against the public, 
it should be accepted by the proper local authorities 
or by general public user. As will be more fully shown 
hereafter, it is not necessary that the act of the owner 
should be evidenced in any formal mode, nor that the 
acceptance of the public should be evidenced by any 
formal act. There are two general kinds of dedication: 
1. Statutory Dedication. 2. Common-Law Dedication 
"A distinguishing difference between a statutory and 
common-law dedication is said to be that the former 
operates by way of a grant, and the latter by way of 
an estoppel in pais rather than by grant." Elliott, Roads 
and Streets, Vol. 1, Sections 122, 125 (emphasis added). 
Since the public right must be against the owner of the 
land, and since the public right can only arise through some 
form of dedication, it naturally follows that the dedication must 
be by the owner of the land: 
rrDedications can only be made by the owner. But 
it has been held that the fact that part of the land 
dedicated for a street does not belong to the dedicator 
does not invalidate the dedication as to the part which 
he does own. A person in possession without title 
can not make an express dedication of the land so as 
to bind the true owner. One of several tenants in com-
mon has no authority to make a dedication, nor can 
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one who has a mere equitable right of reversion." 
Elliott, Roads and Streets, Vol. 1, Section 158 (em-
phasis added) . 
And, obviously, a permissive use whereby the owner con-
sents to public travel is not a dedication and no public right 
is created: 
c cThe intent essential to a valid dedication must be 
to vest an easement, at least, in the public. Where 
there is nothing more than a mere license there is no 
dedication. Where the use is merely permissive, with 
authority in the owner of the servient estate to put 
an end to the use at his pleasure, there is no dedication; 
nor, in such a case, are there such acts as will enable 
the courts to infer an intent to dedicate. He who 
claims against the owner of the fee an easement in 
lands must show either a grant, a continued user for 
twenty years [in Utah, ten years], or facts from which 
an intent to dedicate the land can be fairly inferred." 
Elliott, Roads a12d Streets, Vol. 1, Section 114 (em-
phasis added) . 
ccA farmer may open a private road from one public 
highway to another across his farm, which will accom-
modate, not only himself, but all who choose to travel 
that way. His permission to the general public to travel 
that way is not an act hostile to his title or to his right 
to close the road at any time. So, a manufacturer may 
establish his plant in the center of his lands, and open 
a road to the public highway upon either side, and 
permit the public to use it, and merchants and peddlers 
to travel it, carrying their goods to the houses owned 
by him and occupied by his employees and tenants. But 
such use is permissive, and gives the public no per-
manent rights in it as a highway. So a mining corpo-
ration, as is often the case, constructs roads from the 
public highways in, over, and around its mine, built 
and kept in repair by the company, and permits the 
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public the free use of them. But this does not make 
them public highways within the meaning of the 
statute. Such permissive or invited use is not that use 
contemplated by the statute which will convert a private 
road into a public highway." Stickley v. Sodus Town-
ship, 131 Mich. 510, 91 N.W. 745, 59 L.R.A. 287. 
The Utah statutes are not only clear to the effect that if 
the public cannot assert a right against the owner, the road is 
simply a private one, but the statutes also declare that a per-
missive use does not create rights in the public: 
f(Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent 
the owner of real property used by the public for pur-
poses of vehicular travel by permission of the owner 
and not as a matter of right from prohibiting such use, 
or from requiring other or different or additional con-
ditions than those specified in this act, or otherwise 
regulating such use as may seem best to such owner." 
Section 41-6-18, Utah Code Annotated {1953) (em-
phasis added) . 
((Every way or place in private ownership and used 
for vehicular travel by the owner, and those having 
express or implied permission from the owner, but not 
by other persons" is a private road. Section 41-6-7, 
Utah Code Annotated {1953) (emphasis added). 
Petitioner Arch Dam Constructors is a contractor doing 
work for the United States upon land wholly owned by the 
United States. We readily admit that petiioner cannot enjoin 
the general public from using the access road, not only because 
the construction contract so provides, but, more fundamentally, 
because petitioner has no ownership interest whatever in the 
land traversed by the road, and is in no position to say who 
can or can't use a road belonging to someone else. 
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Respondent seems to contend that the "right" in the 
public to use the access road is a contractual right which the 
public derived as a third party beneficiary to the construction 
contract between petitioner and the United States of America. 
But this is difficult to perceive. Petitioner had no interest in 
the land and could in no way promise an easement or right 
in the public, and did not attempt to do so, but merely recited 
that it would not interfere with public travel (Para. 40a, Ex. 
A) . The United States, as the owner of the land, did not 
promise any easement or right in the public, and, indeed, if 
it had attempted to do so, such an attempt would have been 
futile, for Congress has given no authorization for creating 
such rights in the public through such a contract (petitioner's 
brief, pp. 13-28). The only thing the contract did was to 
recite that the United States owned the road, that the general 
public was being permitted to use it, that the contractor could 
use the road while performing the work, and that the con-
tractor should not imperil the use of the road by the public. 
No argument is made by respondent that the public has any 
rights against the United States, and, as stated above, the 
petitioner had no property rights or interests in the land or 
road to convey to the public or anyone else, even if it had 
attempted to do so. 
Quite frankly, it appears that the argument of respondent 
is a bit too obtuse to lend itself to any rational appli-
cation. We fail to see how anyone can use any land as a 
matter of right against someone who claims absolutely no 
ownership interest in the land. 
It would appear that if the general public has a uright" 
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to use the road as against petitioner, then the public likewise 
has a similar C(right" to use the road against all other parties 
who have no ownership interest in the land traversed by the 
road. For example, following this logic, we are forced to con-
clude that the general public uses the access road in Daggett 
County as a ccmatter of right" against the State of Florida, 
Weber County, and all the farmers in Tooele County. But, 
of course, this is ridiculous, since such a ccright" against those 
having no interest in the land is no right at all, and certainly 
does not change a private road to a public road. The only 
legitimate question is what right does the public have against 
the United States, who is the owner of the road. 
Simple examples, indistinguishable from the present case, 
further highlight the untenable position set forth by respondent. 
Suppose the owner of a farm permits the general public to 
cross his land with their vehicles. Then, one day, the farmer 
hires a contractor to dig some new ditches on his farm, but 
instructs the contractor not to obstruct the road because the 
farmer is permitting the public to use the road. Under the 
rationale of respondent, this simple instruction by the farmer 
has the magical effect of transforming a private road owned 
by the farmer into a public highway which the public uses 
as a matter of right-not because the public has any right 
against the owner, but because the public has some type of 
ccright" against the contractor digging the ditches. 
Or, suppose that a trespasser continually walks across 
the back yard of X. The neighbors cannot complain nor can 
they en join the trespasser from walking across the yard of X. 
Yet, since the trespasser cannot be enjoined by the neighbors 
10 
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of X from crossing the land of X, the trespasser can therefore 
walk across the property of X as a matter of right. Not as a 
matter of right against X, of course, but as a matter of right 
against the neighbors of X, who have no ownership interest 
in the yard of X. We fail to visualize what type of right this 
could be, but respondent says it is sufficient to transform a 
private road into a public highway. 
CONCLUSION 
Failing to find even a pretense of a right in the public 
against the United States to use the access road, respondent 
has argued that it is a sufficient right if the contractor, petitioner 
herein, cannot legally en join the public from using the access 
road. Legal authority is undivided and unambiguous in declar-
ing that a matter of right means a right against the owner 
of the land. There is not the slightest authority, in Utah or 
elsewhere, to sustain the contention urged by respondent. The 
access road is nothing mo~e than a private road, owned by 
the United States and used by the public at the grace of the 
United States, and respondent Tax Commission is wholly with-
out authority to compel petitioner to register and license vehicles 
used exclusively upon the access road. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
By: EDWARD W. CLYDE 
- RICHARD L. DEWSNUP 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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